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IN THE MATTER OF COUNTERCLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY:
SUMMARY PROCEDURE AND THE JURISDICTION OF
THE BANKRUPTCY REFEREE*
CREDITORS of a bankrupt's estate who seek to participate in the distribution
of its assets must submit their claims to proof in the bankruptcy court.' A
referee, sitting as a court of bankruptcy,2 has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
validity of these claims by "summary" procedures, without right of jury trial.3
Section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "mutual debts or credits"
between the creditor and trustee should be offset against each other, by setoff
or counterclaim, and only the net balance allowed or paid.4 The referee has
jurisdiction to implement this section by determining the validity of any de-
fense or setoff the trustee has asserted against a claim filed in the bankruptcy
*Dwyer v. Franklin, 227 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1955) (In the Matter of Majestic Radio
and Television Corp.), petition for cert. filed, 24 U.S.L. WEE:x 3214 (U.S. Feb. 14, 1956)
(No. 671).
1. When a petition in bankruptcy is filed, the bankruptcy court assumes jurisdiction of
all property which the debtor possesses, or to which he has title, as of that time. Thomp-
son v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940) ; 30 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended,
11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1952). Under §§ 57c, n, of the Bankruptcy Act, general creditors
who have claims against the bankrupt estate must file their claims with the bankruptcy
court before the claims can be allowed. 30 STAT. 560 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 93(c), (n) (1952). See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) ; United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S. 205 (1912).
2. " 'Court' shall mean the judge or the referee of the court of bankruptcy in which
the proceedings are pending." 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1 (9) (1952).
The referee may now exercise almost all the powers of a trial judge. See note 39 infra
and accompanying text. The terms "bankruptcy court" or "court of bankruptcy" are
hereinafter used to refer to the referee in bankruptcy rather than the judge of a district
court, unless otherwise indicated. See MacLachlan, Protection and Collection of Property
of Bankrupt Estates, 39 MINN. L. REv. 626, 634 n.26 (1955).
3. Section 2a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 545 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 11 (a) (2) (1952), gives the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to allow or disallow all claims
against the bankrupt's estate. As in all proceedings in the bankruptcy court, summary
procedures are used. See MacDonald v. Plymouth Trust Co., 286 U.S. 263 (1932);
2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 11 23.02 (14th ed., Moore & Oglebay 1940) (hereinafter cited
as COLLIER). Summary proceedings are begun by petition, and are generally somewhat
less formal and lengthy than the "plenary" procedures of a regular civil action, but there
is no substantial difference in the procedures used as such. Ibid.; see 3 id. f 57.18; Mac-
Lachlan, supra note 2, at 634-40. More important than the procedural differences is the
fact that in summary adjudications (1) a referee presides instead of a judge, see note
2 supra, and (2) the constitutional right to jury trial does not obtain, see notes 52-57
infra and accompanying text.
4. "Setoffs and Counterclaims.-a. In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits be-
tween the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt
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court.5 When, however, the trustee asserts a counterclaim for an amount in
excess of the original claim, there has been considerable doubt whether the
referee has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the counterclaim and to
award an affirmative judgment to the trustee." For asserting a counterclaim is
more like initiating an original suit than is asserting a setoff. And if the
creditor had not filed his claim in the bankruptcy court, and had not other-
wise "consented" to summary adjudication, section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act
would have permitted the trustee to initiate his claim against the creditor only
by a regular civil action in a court of general jurisdiction in which the bank-
rupt could have sued.7
The cases recently have tended, although not universally, to uphold the
counterclaim jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court on the theory that the
counterclaim defendant had impliedly consented to it by filing his claim.,
The older cases held jurisdiction lacking in the absence of actual consent.9
shall be set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid." 30 STAT.
565 (189S), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1952).
A setoff differs from a counterclaim only in that the latter seeks an award in excess
of the original claim against which it is filed, whereas the former seeks only to offset
the claim in part. Either may be related or unrelated to the subject matter of the original
claim. This is the terminology suggested in 4 COLLIER 1 68.03. The terms "counter-
claims" and "setoffs" also include claims to recover preferential or fraudulent transfers
voidable under the terms of §§ 60, 67 and 70 of the Bankruptcy Act. The trustee may not
seek to recover preferential or fraudulent transfers under § 68 because the transfer is
not a "mutual" debt within the meaning of § 68. See Mechanics' and Metals Nat'l Bank v.
Ernst, 231 U.S. 60 (1913); United States v. Roth, 164 F.2d 575, 578 (2d Cir. 1948).
However, § 57g of the Bankruptcy Act provides that claims filed by a creditor who has
received a transfer voidable under §§ 60, 67 or 70 of the Act shall not be allowed against
the estate unless the transfer is first surrendered by the creditor. See, generally, 3
COLLIER 1 57.19; 4 id. f1 68.08. Thus the problem whether the referee may, for purposes of
§ 57g, determine that an allegedly voidable preference or transfer may in fact be avoided
is analogous to the problem whether he may determine, for the purposes of § 68a, that
an alleged debt is in fact validly owing to the trustee. The problems being similar, it is
believed that conclusions reached in the following analysis may be based upon, and will
apply to, cases arising under § 57g as well as § 68a.
5. See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
6. See cases cited note 11 infra. See, generally, 4 COLLIER i[ 68.20 (collecting cita-
tions) ; MacLachlan, supra note 2, at 642-44; Nadler, Summary Jurisdiction to Render
Affirinative Judgnent on Counterclaims, Setoffs and Reclamations, 29 REF. J. 39 (1955).
7. "Suits by the ... trustee shall be brought or prosecuted only in the courts where
the bankrupt might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings under this title had
not been instituted, unless by consent of the defendant. . . ." 30 STAT. 552 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1952). For detailed analysis of when § 23 applies, see
note 23 inIra; notes 26-31 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 389 (10th Cir. 1955), cert.
dismissed, 350 U.S. 944 (1956): "[T]he jurisdiction of the court is based upon implied
consent by invocation and is-sustainable upon ... equitable jurisdiction to render full and
complete relief as between petitioning parties to the court." See also cases cited note 11
infra.
9. E.g., Thalhimer, Inc. v. Florance, 58 F.2d 23 (4th Cir. 1932) ; Triangle Elec. Co.
v. Foutch, 40 F.2d 353, 357 (8th Cir. 1930) (dictum) ; Metz v. Knobel, 21 F.2d 317 (2d
Cir. 1927).
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In 1935; however, the Supreme Court determined that filing a claim in an
equity receivership proceeding should be deemed consent by "invocation" to
the receivership court's jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim. 10 The
majority of circuits thereafter began to find consent more readily in bank-
ruptcy cases." They buttressed the finding with a statutory a.rgument: since
the referee could summarily adjudicate the validity of a defense or setoff
asserted by the trustee,1 2 it was assumed that he also had jurisdiction to deter-
mine the merits of a counterclaim; for the counterclaim, although it sought
an affirmative award, also sought in part to offset the claim of the creditor.' 3
10. Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222 (1935). The Supreme Court held that
invoking the jurisdiction of the receivership tribunal by filing a claim with it thereby
conferred in personam jurisdiction upon the receivership court, enabling it to render an
affirmative judgment on a permissive counterclaim. Id. at 241-42. Subject matter juris-
diction was not in issue. Id. at 238. The decision seemed based primarily upon the de-
sirability of the speed and economy with which cases could be considered and adjudicated
by the referee in the receivership court. See id. at 242-43.
Hillman seems in rather sharp conflict with the Court's earlier decision in Daniel v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 285 U.S. 154 (1932). In the Daniel case the Court held that the
trustee could not assert a permissive counterclaim against a reclamation petitioner in the
bankruptcy court. The Court stated that Equity Rule 30 (permitting the procedural device
of permissive counterclaims in equity proceedings) should not be applied to bankruptcy:
"We cannot conclude that the demand for speedy administration of bankrupt estates is
enough to justify such a radical departure from ordinary procedure." Id. at 162. The
legal rationale of the Daniel case is now outdated, since FED. R. Civ. P. 13 makes the
use of permissive counterclaims an accepted procedure; rule 13 has been made applicable
to bankruptcy proceedings by General Order 37, 305 U.S. 681, 698 (1939). Moreover,
the policy subsequently adopted in the Hilhinan case is applicable to bankruptcy as well as
to receivership.
11. Conway v. Union Bank, 204 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1953) (chapter X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act), cert. deferred sub non. Silesian Holding Co. v. Union Bank, 350 U.S. 858
(1955) ; In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952) (chapter X), cert. denied sub
nom. Marine Midland Trust Co. v. McGirl, 345 U.S. 940 (1953) ; Florance v. Kresge, 93
F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Floro Realty & Inv. Co. v. Steem Elec. Corp., 128 F.2d 338 (Sth
Cir. 1942) (reclamation) (Chapter X) ; Bank of California, Nat'l Ass'n v. McBride, 132
F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955),
cert. dismissed, 350 U.S. 944 (1956). Contra, B. F. Avery & Sons Co. v. Davis, 192 F.2d
255 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 949 (1952) ; Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Keig,
98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1939) ; Solomon v. Allied Bldg.
Credits, Inc., 209 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1954) (semble) ; cf. Fitch v. Richardson, 147 Fed. 197
(1st Cir. 1906). Recent district court cases contra; In re Houston Seed Co., 122 F. Supp.
340 (N.D. Ala. 1954) ; In re C. A. Goldsmith Co., 122 F. Supp. 191 (D.N.J. 1954) (recla-
mation) ; In re Tommie's Dine & Dance, 102 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Tex. 1952).
12. See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947) (§ 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act) ; Triangle Elec. Co. v. Foutch , 40 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1930) (dictum) ; In re
Patterson-MacDonald Shipbuilding Co., 284 Fed. 281 (W.D. Wash. 1922), aff'd on other
grrounds, 293 Fed. 192 (9th Cir. .1923) ; In re. Continental Producing Co., 261 Fed. 627
(SAD. Cal. 1919); MacLachlan, supra note 2, at 642. See, generally, 4 COLLIEM f 68.20,
at 787-88.
13. The bankruptcy court merely adjudicated the trustee's counterclaim, disallowing
or deferring payment of the creditor's claim, but making no judgment or other affirmative
award pursuant to the determination. See, e.g., Fitch v. Richardson, 147 Fed. 197 (lst
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The bankruptcy court's determination of the validity of the setoff was given
the effect of collateral estoppel, foreclosing relitigation of the merits in subse-
quent proceedings. 14 Therefore a plenary suit to collect the excess was con-
sidered a perfunctory step, and most courts concluded that the creditor had
in effect "consented" to the entry of an affirmative order in the bankruptcy
court. 15
The recent case of Dwyer v. Franklin 16 rejected the statutory consent
rationale. Franklin filed a claim of $1,481 for goods sold to the bankrupt; the
trustee asserted a counterclaim of $442,167 for an alleged breach of fiduciary
duty completely unrelated to the original claim. 1 7 The Seventh Circuit stated
Cir. 1906) ; In re Bowers, 33 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Calif. 1940). Some early cases indicated
that jurisdiction could not be exercised unless the trustee waived his right to the amount
by which his counterclaim exceeded the creditor's claim. E.g., Triangle Elec. Co. v.
Foutch, supra note 12; In re Patterson-MacDonald Shipbuilding Co., supra note 12;
In re Continental Producing Co., supra note 12. The more recent decisions, however,
generally allowed the trustee to recover the excess by a subsequent suit. E.g., Griffin
v. Vought, 175 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Johnson v. Wilson, 118 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1941) ;
In re Nathan, 98 F. Supp. 686, 691 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (dictum). But see B. F. Avery & Sons
Co. v. Davis, 192 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 949 (1952), where the
Fifth Circuit applied § 23 of the Bankruptcy Act to prevent the bankruptcy court from
even passing on the validity of the trustee's counterclaim because its determination
would have been binding as collateral estoppel. See note 14 infra. The court directed
that the claim should be held in abeyance pending a plenary suit by the trustee to recover
the alleged preference upon which the counterclaim was based.
14. Schwartz v. Levine & Malin, Inc., 111 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Breit v. Moore,
220 Fed. 97 (9th Cir. 1915) ; B. F. Avery & Sons Co. v. Davis, supra note 13; MacLachlan,
stepra note 2, at 642. There is some question whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction
to make a determination as to the amount due to the estate; or, if the determination is made,
whether it also would operate as collateral estoppel. Most decisions have considered such
findings as to the amount conclusive. E.g., Griffin v. Vought, supra note 13; Johnson v.
Wilson, supra note 13; Schwartz v. Levine & Malin, Inc., supra. But see Feiring v.
Gano, 114 Colo. 567, 168 P.2d 901 (1946). For extensive discussion, see Gee, A Persistant
Conflict Revived Over Collateral Attack Upon Disallowance of a Claim by a Referee in
Bankruptcy, 26 ORE. L. REv. 188 (1947).
15. "The legal result being in substance the same as if actual consent had been given,
there exists a rational and solid ground for holding that a creditor, by presenting his
claim . . . impliedly consents to adjudication by the bankruptcy court in summary pro-
ceedings ... of any counterclaim for an affirmative judgment. . . ." In re Nathan, 98 F.
Supp. 626, 692 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (compulsory counterclaim). See also Inter-State Nat'l
Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 389 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed, 350 U.S. 944 (1956)
(permissive counterclaim), quoted note 8 supra; Columbia Foundry Co. v. Lochner, 179
F.2d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 1950) (compulsory counterclaim).
16. 227 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1955), petition for cert. filed, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3214 (U.S.
Feb. 14, 1956) (No. 671).
17. After Chapter X reorganization had proven infeasible, the corporation was ad-
judicated a bankrupt. Transcript of Record, p. 3, Dwyer v. Franklin, 227 F.2d 152 (7th
Cir. 1955). While the Chapter X proceedings were pending, Franklin had filed a claim
as a supplicr to whom the corporation was indebted on open book account. Id. at 8-10.
However, he had also been a director of the corporation, id. at 3, and during the bank-
ruptcy proceedings the trustee objected to the claim and counterclaimed, alleging that
Franklin had participated in the improper authorization of a stock option program, id. at
18. See also id. at 22-23.
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that filing a claim should be deemed implied consent to summary adjudication
of only those counterclaims arising out of the same subject matter as the
original claim ;18 without actual consent,19 the referee had no jurisdiction even
to consider the merits of an unrelated counterclaim. 20 The court recognized
that under section 68 the referee should set off mutual debts and credits, but
held that this section merely required him to defer allowance of the creditor's
claim until the validity of the trustee's counterclaim could be determined by
another court in a regular civil action.21 For section 68 establishes a mode of
procedure, but does not in itself convey a grant of jurisdiction.2 2  And the
Seventh Circuit stated that under section 23 the only courts with jurisdiction
to determine claims brought by the trustee against nonconsenting adverse
parties are those courts in which the bankrupt could have sued before bank-
ruptcy.23
18. "A litigant could hardly claim a recovery on the basis of a certain fact situation
without permitting the court to decide all of the legal consequences of that situation."
Dwyer v. Franklin, supra note 17, at 156.
19. As is often the case in counterclaim situations, Franklin (the counterclaim de-
fendant) objected to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over either the subject matter of
the counterclaim or his person as soon as the counterclaim was asserted. Id. at 154, 156;
cf. notes 27, 32 infra.
20. Dwyer v. Franklin, 227 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1955). Cf. B. F. Avery & Sons
Co. v. Davis, 192 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1951), discussed in note 13 supra. Strangely enough,
the court did not cite the Davis case. The reason may have been that Davis' counterclaim
involved a preference, a situation which the Seventh Circuit may have considered distin-
guishable. See note 23 infra.
21. Dwyer v. Franklin, supra note 20, at 156-57. The court, wholly on the authority
of 1 Am. JUR., Accounts and Accounting § 16, at 272 (1939), discussing a different
matter, concluded that the mutual debts referred to in § 68a, see note 4 supra, "could not
refer to an unliquidated claim for damages. .. ." And by "liquidated" the court apparently
meant reduced to judgment. But see notes 43-44 infra and accompanying text.
22. Dwyer v. Franklin, 227 F.2d 152, 156-57 (7th Cir. 1955).
23. Id. at 155. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
It is possible that the court did not intend its decision to apply to counterclaims involv-
ing §§ 60 (preferences), 67 (fraudulent conveyances) or 70 (both) of the Bankruptcy
Act. The court distinguished the recent Tenth Circuit case of Inter-State Nat'l Bank v.
Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed, 350 U.S. 944 (1956) (sustaining
summary adjudication of permissive counterclaim based upon allegedly preferential trans-
fer), on the ground that there was an exception in § 23 created for claims arising under
§§ 60, 67 or 70. The exception to which the court adverted refers to a proviso in each of
these sections which states that "where plenary proceedings are necessary . . . any court
of bankruptcy shall have . . . jurisdiction. . . ' See, e.g., § 60b, 30 STAT. 562 (1893), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1952). Thus it seems possible that the court would distin-
guish a future case involving a counterclaim based upon a transaction covered by one of
those sections.
Such a distinction would have some merit. Claims not covered by those sections do
not arise with as great frequency in bankruptcy litigation. But cf. note 42 infra. Con-
sequently they are not so much of the fabric of the Act, nor so peculiarly within the
expertise of the referee.
Nevertheless, the court's distinction does not withstand analysis. For the exception
in § 23 to which it referred has invariably been construed to deal only with federal
jurisdiction; it enables the trustee to sue in a district court without respect to diversity
(Vol. 65
NOTES
The Seventh Circuit's analysis of the Dwyer case really assumed the con-
clusion the court reached. True, section 68 is a procedural directive and not
a grant of jurisdiction; in bankruptcy, as elsewhere, a court must have separate
grounds of jurisdiction in order to adjudicate an unrelated counterclaim. 24
And if section 23 applies, the only courts with jurisdiction over permissive
counterclaims are those in which the bankrupt could once have sued.25 Never-
theless, it appears that the court erred in assuming that section 23 did apply
simply because the counterclaim defendant was a nonconsenting adverse claim-
antY If he had not objected to summary adjudication, section 23 would
never apply.2 7 But the absence of consent is only one prerequisite to the appli-
cability of the section. Section 23 by its own terms affects only "suits . ..
brought or prosecuted" by the trustee.28 It comes into operation only if sum-
mary procedures cannot, so that plenary procedures must, be used.2 9 For
of citizenship. It does not grant suminary jurisdiction (i.e., jurisdiction to determine a
controversy by summary procedures) to the referee. See Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S.
642, 650 (1947) ; Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268 (1920) ; Harris Trust & Savings Bank
v. Keig, 98 F.2d 952, 957 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1938) ; 2 COLLIER
f 23.15 (collecting added citations) ; MacLachlan, supra note 2, at 645. But there already
was federal jurisdiction in Dwyer, based on diversity. Transcript of Record, pp. 6-9,
Dwyer v. Franklin, supra note 22. The only question (in Dwyer and Luther) was the
scope of the bankruptcy court's suimary jurisdiction, as to which the exception in § 23
is entirely irrelevant. Thus, the distinction drawn by the Seventh Circuit seems to be
without legal substance; it would therefore not be likely, if the argument were brought
to the court's attention by counsel, to provide a valid standard for limiting the Dwyer
decision in either the Seventh Circuit or any other court following the Dwyer rule.
24. See Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 390 (10th Cir. 1955);
In re Nathan, 93 F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D. Cal. 1951); 4 COLLIER ir 68.02, at 712. For
the ordinary rule outside bankruptcy, established by FED. R. Civ. P. 13, see, generally, 3
MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE, fl 13.19[1] (2d ed. 1948).
25. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
26. The Seventh Circuit completely identified counterclaims with turnover proceed-
ings; the "adverse claimant" concept grew out of and relates to the bankruptcy court's
powers over the rights of persons not before it. Except for specific statutory grants here
irrelevant, the established rule is that absent actual consent, see note 27 infra, the bank-
ruptcy court may not summarily adjudicate the rights of third parties holding property
under an adverse claim of right which is more than "colorable." The adverse claimant is
entitled to a plenary suit governed by § 23b. Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191 (1926) ;
Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 438 (1924). See 2 COLLIER 1f 23.06;
MacLachlan, supra note 2, at 637-38. The court assumed the same rule would apply to
a party already before the court. Yet these two situations are by no means identical,
so that a different treatment may well be proper.
27. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. Answering the trustee's counterclaim
without objecting to the court's jurisdiction constitutes "actual" consent to its jurisdiction.
In re Petroleum Conversion Corp., 99 F. Supp. 899 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd per curiam,
196 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied sub mtan. Vaughan v. Petroleum .Conversion Corp.,
344 U.S. 917 (1953); Harris Bank & Trust Co. v. Keig, 98 F.2d 952, 959 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1938) ; cf. 66 STAT. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (7) ; Nadler,
supra note 6, at 40.
28. See note 7 supra.
29. See note 30 infra.
Section 2a(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, quoted in note 33 infra, grants the bankruptcy
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section 23 limits the jurisdiction of the district, but not the bankruptcy
courts.30
The real question in the Dwyer case is not whether the creditor "consented,"
but whether permissive counterclaims asserted against a claimant in a bank-
ruptcy court should be determined by summary or plenary procedures. In
statutory terms, the question is whether an unrelated counterclaim, respon-
sively asserted by the trustee in a proceeding he has not initiated, is sufficiently
like a "suit ... brought or prosecuted" by him that it should fall within the
operation of section 23.31 The terms of the Bankruptcy Act do not provide an
answer to these questions.
If section 23 need not be applied, the referee would have the jurisdiction
over person and subject matter necessary to award judgment on the counter-
claim-with or without the creditor's consent.32 The bankruptcy court is in-
court jurisdiction over controversies amenable to summary adjudication. But Congress
did not attempt to establish a formula by which to determine when a controversy should
come under "summary" or "plenary" procedures; it left that question to the courts. See
Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 431 n.8 (1924) ; cf. 2 COLLIER ff 23.02.
The answer has been largely circular: a plenary suit is necessary if the bankruptcy court
does not have "summary jurisdiction." Professor MacLachlan states that the bankruptcy
court's summary jurisdiction is limited by "concepts of tradition, of due process, and of
common sense." MacLachlan, supra note 2, at 644.
The general rule established for turnover proceedings is that summary jurisdiction
exists only when the adverse party does not assert a more-than-colorable claim of right.
See notes 7, 26 supra. But this rule is wholly oriented towards a situation in which the
adverse claimant is not already in the bankruptcy court. And if for other reasons, see
notes 32-37 infra and accompanying text, it appeared that § 2a(7) would grant summary
jurisdiction to the court without possession of property held under an adverse claim of
right, then a plenary suit would not be necessary and § 23 would not apply.
30. 2 CoIER ff 23.03 (collecting citations); MacLachlan, supra note 2, at 644-45
("Section 23 governs the plenary jurisdiction, and Section . .. [2a(7)] the summary,
and the relation between them [is] purely complementary. . . .") ; Moore & Tone, Pro-
posed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression? 57 YALE L.J. 683, 710-
11 (1948). See also discussion in City of Long Beach v. Metcalf, 103 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 602 (1939). Thus it is misleading to take the view of the Dwyer
case that § 23 "limits" the grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court in § 2a(7).
Section 23 applies only if a plenary suit is necessary-in which case, by definition, § 2a(7)
is already inoperative. See note 29 supra. This seems true even though § 2a(7), and
not § 23, is the source of the district court's grant of jurisdiction over plenary cases. See
Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947) (Chapter X).
31. In other contexts a counterclaim has not always been treated as an original suit
brought by the (original) defendant. See, e.g., Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 240
(1935) (counterclaim is not an "original action" for purposes of a venue statute);
Sheets v. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp., 115 F.2d 880, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1940), aff'd, 313
U.S. 100, 106-107 (1941) (counterclaim defendant is -not "defendant" for -purposes of
removal statute).
32. The fiction of "implied Consent" has been used to achieve results which seem
sound. See cases cited note 11 supra. But several district courts have bridled at the use
of so fictional a standard, and have refused to imply consent when the counterclaim de-
fendant objected to counterclaim jurisdiction as soon as it was asserted. See district court
cases cited note 11 supra; cf. note 19 supra. The issues are more clearly brought into
focus if the fiction is discarded; and the fiction is not necessary to arrive at the desired
[Vol. 65
NOTES
vested with subject matter jurisdiction at law and in equity to determine all
controversies related to the collection and disposition of the bankrupt estate.
33
This jurisdiction may be exercised when the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction
over the thing in controversy.34 It would seem equally operative if there were
jurisdiction over the person of the claimant rather than the thing which he is
claiming.'5 And in the counterclaim situation, unlike turnover proceedings
initiated by the trustee, the bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction over the
person of the adverse claimant.36 Absent special considerations, every court
has personal jurisdiction over any person appearing before it.3
result. For the question is not so much whether there was consent as whether the counter-
claim defendant is precluded from objecting to the assertion of statutory jurisdiction.
See notes 33-38 infra and accompanying text.
33. Section 2a (7) of the Bankruptcy Act provides: "The [judge or the referee of the
court of bankruptcy in which the proceedings are pending is] . . . hereby invested . . .
with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to . . . (7) Cause the
estates of bankrupts to be collected . . . and distributed, and determine controversies in
relation thereto," unless limited by § 23. 30 STAT. 545-46 (1899), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 11(a) (7) (1952).
Section 23 does not really limit the extent of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over
subject matter. Rather, it provides a directive as to which courts may hear "suits"
"brought or prosecuted" by the trustee. By definition, the bankruptcy court did not have
jurisdiction to hear these suits in the first place. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying
text. But the reason the bankruptcy court could not adjudicate these disputes is not lack
of subject inatter jurisdiction: it is lack of jurisdiction over the person or thing involved.
This seems apparent because § 2a(7) grants co-extensive subject matter jurisdiction to
both the district court and the bankruptcy court. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642
(1947).
34. The numerous authorities are collected in 2 CoLLiE ff 23.05-23.08.
35. Generally, jurisdiction over the thing is not necessary if a court has jurisdiction
over the person claiming or possessing the thing. See, e.g., Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S.
298, 303 (1878) ; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 623 (1912) ; Detroit Trust
Co. v. Campbell River Timber Co., 98 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1938) (§ 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS 5-7 (1942); cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877).
Nor is there anything inherent in the nature of bankruptcy proceedings that would
limit the courts to in rem jurisdiction. See Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S.
426, 430-31 (1924). When property is in the court's possession, the court may issue an
order to the claimant to show cause why his claim to it should not be avoided; if he does
not appear, his rights may be determined without his presence. See generally 2 COLLIER
if 23.05[2]. If the party already is before the court, there would seem to be no reason why
the court could not determine his rights in regard to all claims properly within its
subject matter jurisdiction. See Detroit Trust Co. v. Campbell River Timber Co., supra
at 392 (§ 77B).
36. Bly filing a claim or initiating a suit a party is within the court's in personam
jurisdiction for all matters procedurally authorized and within the court's subject matter
juri'diction. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S.
222 (1935.) (equity receiverfship); Young v. McNeal-Edwards Co, 283 U.S. 398, 400
(1931); Conway v. Union Bank, 204 F2d 603 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. deferred sub nora.
Silesian Holding Co. v. Union Bank, 350 U.S. 858 (1955).
A "consent" rationale is unnecessary; the rule is better stated positively. There is no
rcason to treat filing a claim as merely a "special appearance" which the claimant may
limit to suit his purposes. To do so would be contrary to the policy of the Bankruptcy
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There are compelling arguments in favor of considering section 23 inapplic-
able to the counterclaim situation in order to sustain the summary jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court. The underlying objection to summary adjudication
of counterclaims apparently is, although never explicitly recognized in the
cases, a general belief among creditors that referees are collection conscious.38
But it is contrary to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act to presume that referees
are unduly favorable to the estate: the Act has continually attempted to pro-
mote the referee, sitting as a court of bankruptcy, to the full power, prestige
and responsibility of a trial judge.39 The expanded role of the referee serves
Act. See notes 38-44 infra and accompanying text. Moreover, special appearances are
generally confined to appearances to challenge jurisdiction. RESTATE ENT, JUDGMENTs §
20 (1942). If filing a claim is a general appearance, however, the court then has jurisdic-
tion over the claimant for all purposes to which its subject matter jurisdiction extends;
and if permissive counterclaims are procedurally permissible-they are in bankruptcy, see
note 4 supra and accompanying text; note 10 supra-the court has jurisdiction to award
an affirmative judgment against the original claimant. See cases cited supra; RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS § 21, comment c (1942); cf. id. §§ 19, 20.
37. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
"Special" considerations may exist in two situations. (1) If the trustee has a turnover
order issued against a third party as to property in the actual or constructive possession
of the court, that party ought to be able to prevent the trustee from asserting another
claim, concerning property not in the court's possession, after the third party has come in
to defend the turnover order. Cf. Ex Parte Indiana Transp. Co., 244 U.S. 456 (1917).
This would be consistent with the Bankruptcy Act because the claim subsequently asserted
by the trustee would clearly seem to be a "suit" "brought or prosecuted" by him within
the meaning of § 23, and therefore entitled to plenary adjudication without respect to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. (2) If the third party, rather than presenting proof of
claim, comes to the bankruptcy court to reclaim specified property in the court's actual
possession, it might be considered appropriate to permit him to limit his appearance to
questions concerning that property. If that conclusion is reached, although it is not here
advocated, a special exception could be created for the situation on the theory that his
appearance was not as a claimant but as an "owner."
38. See MacLachlan, Protection and Collection of Property of Bankrupt Estates,
39 MiNN. L. REv. 626, 639-40 (1955). This belief seems due in large part on the historical
fact that the referee's compensation was based wholly on a percentage of the amount dis-
bursed to creditors as dividends; every claim on which the trustee prevailed was of direct
financial benefit to the referee. See S. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1946) ;
REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITTEE ox BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION, AD-
MINISTRATION OF THE BANKRuPTcY ACT 94-97 (1940); Hunt, Summary Jurisdiction
in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 50 Com. L.J. 59 (1945) ; Statement of Senator Huffman, 92
CON"G. REc. 6386 (1946) ; 2 COLLER [ 40.05-40.09. This system was abolished in 1946, and
the referee is now paid an annual salary (up to $12,500) wholly independent of the amount
of money brought into the bankrupt estate. 60 STAT. 326 (1946), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
68 (1952). See, generally, Chandler, The Outlook Under the New Referee Act, 21 REF.
3. 9 (1946).
39. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1037, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1945); Statement of
Senator Huffman, 92 CoxG. REc. 6386 (1946). Except for lack of power to issue injunc-
tions against courts and punish for contempt, his powers are the same as those of the
trial judge. See, generally, 2 CoLLIER 1 38.02. General Order 47, 305 U.S. 702 (1939),
dictates that on review the findings of the referee are to be accepted unless "clearly
erroneous." To contribute further to his judicial status, the referee has been accorded a
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two valid purposes. By centralizing litigation in a single court of bankruptcy,
with an up-to-date calendar, the Act promotes more expeditious and economical
disposition of the bankrupt estate, thus allowing a more generous dividend
to all general creditors. 40 Furthermore, by presenting most of the controversies
arising from the bankrupt's insolvency before one trier of fact, the latter is
able to acquire a greater expertise in dealing with the complex factual and
legal issues which arise from the insolvency. 41 Indeed, it has been suggested
that it is often this expertise, and not a predisposition to favor trustees, that
makes creditors wary of the bankruptcy court. 42
Furthermore, section 68, although not a grant of jurisdiction, constitutes a
recognition of policies which strongly indicate that summary jurisdiction over
counterclaims ought to be sustained. While section 68 does not expressly state
which court is to determine the validity of a setoff or counterclaim, it is oriented
towards eliminating multiple litigation in different courts.43 To promote this
greater degree of tenure (formerly two, now six years). See 60 STAT. 324 (1946), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 62 (1952).
If in a given case the referee's findings are unduly favorable to the trustee, judicial
review by the district court is always available, even on interlocutory decisions, to correct
shown errors or prejudices. See § 39c; 2 COLIER i" 39.21. Moreover, an inarticulate presunmp-
tion of prejudice is in conflict with the congressional intent to create a judicial status for the
referee in order to facilitate the administration and distribution of the bankrupt estate. See
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CommITTEE, op. cit. supra, note 38, at 94-97.
40. The number of referees available can easily be increased to meet changes in work
load. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 61 (1949); S. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946).
Therefore summary litigation could be more speedily begun than if the trustee were forced
to resort to crowded courts of general jurisdiction. See 2 COLLIER ff 23.02[2]; Elpern,
The AlcLaughlin Bill to Establish a System of Fill-Time, Salaried Referees in Bank-
ruptcy, 29 VA. L. REv. 168, 170 (1942). Moreover, the estate would also be saved the
added expense of costs and attorney's fees incident to enforcing claims in plenary pro-
ceedings in remote forums. Cf. Chandler, supra note 38; Hunt, supra note 38; United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S. 205, 218 (1912).
41. Furthermore, uniform treatment of all the bankrupt's creditors should result from
adjudication of as many claims as possible by a single judge. And to the extent that cer-
tain types of issues are frequently raised in bankruptcy proceedings, the referee develops
an expertise in regard to the "bankruptcy specialties." See note 42 infra. An analogy is
suggested to the expertise of administrative agencies.
42. Gendel, Jurisdiction of a Referee in Bankruptcy to Render Affirmative Judgment
on a Counterclaim in Favor of a Trustee, 26 So. CALIF. L. REv. 167, 172-73 (1953) ; cf.
Utley, Summary Jurisdiction, 16 REF. J. 38, 39-40 (1941). Claims of breached fiduciary
duty, such as those raised in the Dwyer case, see note 17 supra and accompanying text,
while not "bankruptcy specialities" as fully as preferences and fraudulent conveyances, are
quite frequently raised by trustees in proceedings concerning corporate debtors. Fiduciary
liability was involved not only in Dwyer, but in, e.g., Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642
(1947) ; Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222 (1935) ; In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327
(3d Cir. 1952) ; Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Keig, 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938).
43. The court before which a claim is asserted has the primary duty of determining
for itself whether there are "mutual debts or credits" that should be set off against one
another. See Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 237 U.S. 447 (1915); In re
Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 103 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1939) ; In re Nathan, 98 F. Supp. 686,
692 (S.D. Cal. 1951) ; 4 COLLIER f" 68.02, at 710.
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policy, counterclaims should be adjudicated by the court in which the original
claim was filed."4 The decision in the Dwyer case would compel the opposite
result, and precipitate the very circuity of litigation which section 68 was de-
signed to prevent. Under Dwyer the trustee may set off not "mutual debts
or credits" but only judgments.
There are also policies promoted by section 23, primarily concerning venue
and trial by jury,45 which should not be ignored. The policies are not always
pertinent to the counterclaim situation. When they are, however, they tend
to blur the significance of a verbal distinction between commencing a suit and
filing a counterclaim. The distinction is further obscured the less related the
counterclaim is to the subject matter involved in the original claim, and the
greater the excess amount the trustee seeks. Alternative procedures ex.ist,
however, by which the policies implicit in section 23 may be fully effectuated
without broadly construing that section to oust the bankruptcy court of sum-
mary jurisdiction over counterclaims.46
Section 23 is essentially a venue provision.47 Therefore, it would seem that
the filing of a relatively small, liquidated claim in the bankruptcy court-the
44. See note 43 supra.
Similarly, when the trustee initiates a plenary suit outside the bankruptcy court, the
defendant should be able to assert any setoff or counterclaim he had against the trustee.
This is the general rule. E.g., Wiilcox v. Goess, 92 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1937), cort. denied,
303 U.S. 647 (1938); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Graham, 145 Fed. 809 (4th Cir. 1906).
But cf. Page v. Rogers, 211 U.S. 575 (1909) (special exception required when unsecured
claim resulting from avoidance of transfer necessarily equals amount recovered by trustee)
Keppel v. Tiffin Say. Bank, 197 U.S. 356 (1905) (same).
45. See notes 47-57 infra and accompanying text.
In addition to jury trial and venue, § 23 embodied a policy against expanding federal
jurisdiction. See Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Williams v. Austrian, 331
U.S. 642, 662 (1947). This was partly done with an eye towards the venue problem, id.
at 649 (majority), but also to restrict the business of the already-crowded district courts.
See Mussman & Riesenfeld, .1urisdiction in Bankruptcy, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PRIOB. 8S,
101 (1948). But it has been pointed out that § 23 is a limitation on the jurisdiction of
the federal district courts, not the referee sitting as a court of bankruptcy. See notes
28-30 supra and accompanying text. Permitting the referee to adjudicate counterclaims
by the trustee will decrease the workload of the district courts to the extent that claims
now litigated in the district court are heard by the referee. Thus the only objection re-
maining is that the already-crowded state courts might be jealous of the bankruptcy
litigation they will be unable to try.
46. When the counterclaim is far greater in amount than the original claim, and the
litigation of each would center about different issues and require different evidence, as
is true in the Dwyer case, it would be letting the tail wag the dog to deny that the
creditor should have substantially the same rights as if the trustee had brought the counter-
claim by a plenary action. It should not be forgotten that § 68 is permissive rather than
mandatory. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 237 U.S. 447, 455 (1915) ; Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 763 (1938) ;
4 COLLIER ir 68.02. The court, even if it has jurisdiction, need not adjudicate the counter-
claim if it appears inequitable to do so. See notes 47-51 infra and accompanying text.
47. See Chase Nat'l Bank v. Lyford, 147 F.2d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 1945). Section 23 is
"jurisdictional" in the sense that it requires plenary suits to be brought in state courts
unless the bankrupt could have brought the suit in the district court. See Schumacher v.
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only court in which the claim could be filed 4s-should not be grounds for
compelling the creditor to litigate the merits of a sizable and unrelated counter-
claim in the bankruptcy court if that litigation would entail the production of
witnesses and evidence not required for proof of the original claim and not
conveniently accessible to the bankruptcy court.49 Yet the burden should be
on the creditor to show such inaccessibility before it is concluded that the
bankruptcy court is an inconvenient forum.50 And in any event the conse-
quence of an inconvenient venue should not be loss of jurisdiction by the
bankruptcy court; transfer of venue to a more convenient bankruptcy court
would seem a more appropriate remedy.51
Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934). But congressional intent in enacting § 23 was to avoid
the inconvenience to witnesses and litigants that resulted (in 1898) from the geographical
inaccessibility of district courts in many states. Ibid.; see Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S.
642, 649 n.15 and legislative history there cited.
48. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
Venue objections cannot be made to a counterclaim in a regular civil action. General
Elec. Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932). But since the creditor in
bankruptcy had to file his claim in the bankruptcy court, if at all, the general rule
would seem subject to modification. But cf. Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222 (1935)
(no venue objection to counterclaim permitted in equity receivership). General Order
37, 305 U.S. 681 (1939), which applies the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bank-
ruptcy, explicitly provides that they shall be applied only to the extent they are consistent
with the Bankruptcy Act.
49. In the Dwyer case, Franklin (the creditor) did not argue that it would be incon-
venient for him to produce witnesses or evidence on the breach of fiduciary duty question.
He did contend, however, that the bankruptcy court would be an inappropriate forum
because it was jurisdictionally unable to bring in co-directors whom he felt were interested
parties. Brief for Appellee, p. 51, Dwyer v. Franklin, 227 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1955) ; cf.
criterion A(3), note 50 infra.
50. It would seem sound to adopt the criteria established for the determination of
inconvenient forum in regular civil proceedings in the federal courts. The burden should
be on the person claiming the forum is inconvenient to make a compelling showing that
the disadvantages to him outweigh the advantages accruing to the trustee by litigating
in the bankruptcy court in which claims must be filed. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 508 (1947). In the Gulf case the Supreme Court suggested an illustrative,
although not exhaustive, list of revelant criteria. A. The private inconvenience should
be weighed in terms of (1) access to proof and evidence, (2) cost of obtaining attendance
of witnesses, (3) availability of compulsory process to compel unwilling parties or wit-
nesses to appear, (4) possibility of viewing the premises, and (5) enforceability of
judgment if obtained. B. The public inconvenience should be weighed in terms of (1)
congestion of calendars, (2) burden of jury duty, (3) local interest in local controversies,
and (4) desirability of applying local law through the court which generally applies it.
51. Although at common law a suit in a court found to be "non conveniens" had to be
dismissed, the Judicial Code has established a preferable solution, transfer to a more con-
veniently located court. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952) ; see Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349
U.S. 29 (1955). This procedure should be used also by the bankruptcy court in the
counterclaim situation; if the objection to exercise of its jurisdiction is on grounds of
venue, the remedy should be in terms of more appropriate venue. Dismissal or transfer
to a district court would go well beyond the venue objection.
Transfer of the cause to another bankruptcy court would seem to be authorized by
§§ 2a(19), (20) of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 2a(19) allows one bankruptcy court to
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It might also be urged that section 23 should be applied, when the trustee
asserts a "legal" counterclaim, in order to assure the creditor of trial by jury.'2
Historically, the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury has never been ap-
plied to the equitable proceedings of the bankruptcy courtYr3 Therefore it
might be argued that extension of bankruptcy jurisdiction to this class of
counterclaims would abridge the right of trial by jury 4 This conclusion is
debatable.5 Even if accepted, however, it would not follow that section 23
must be invoked to deprive the bankruptcy court of counterclaim jurisdiction."
Its jurisdiction recognized for other purposes, the bankruptcy court could be
required to transfer the counterclaim to the district court whenever the right
to jury was properly claimed; alternatively, it would be possible for the referee
specially to impanel a jury in the bankruptcy court when that seemed appro-
transfer a case; § 2a(20) permits another to exercise ancillary jurisdiction when the
primary litigation is being conducted in another court of bankruptcy. While these pro-
visions have never been so used, there seems to be no reason why they are not appropriate
for the purpose. See Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U.S. 102 (1910) ; cf. In re Lustron Corp.,
184 F.2d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied sub norn. RFC v. Lustron Corp., 340 U.S.
946 (1951). Alternatively, as a court of equity, the bankruptcy court could allow dismissal
only on condition that respondent consent to summary adjudication in a more convenient
bankruptcy court.
52. Section 19c of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "the right to submit to a jury
matters in controversy ... shall be determined ... according to the laws of the United
States now in force or such as may be hereafter enacted in relation to trials by jury."
30 STAT. 551 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 42 (1952). In the Dwyer case, jury trial
was not involved because the trustee's counterclaim was "equitable" in nature. Cf. note
17 supra and accompanying text.
53. See Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881) ; 2 COLLIER 19.07; 5 MooRE, FuI-
ERAL PRAcric 38.30 (2d ed. 1951).
54. These counterclaims have by no means been historically considered within the
summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying
text. And, when litigated in plenary suits, jury rights obtained as at common law.
Therefore, the consequence of now classifying the counterclaim as subject to summary
adjudication ordinarily is to restrict the right to have these claims tried to a jury; the
summary proceedings traditionally have been without jury.
55. The obvious answer to the argument stated in note 54 supra, is that if such contro-
versies are properly classified as subject to summary adjudication, there is no diminution
of a validly subsisting right to trial by jury. Congress could, of course, constitutionally
extend the scope of summary jurisdiction in bankruptcy. See Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co.
v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1924). If the scope already covers counterclaims against a
defendant before the bankruptcy court, no jury right ever properly existed. Essentially
like the argument in note 54, however, this argument begs the question; the conclusion
reached would appear to turn upon the relative importance given by the courts to jury
trial.
Under the consent rationale the problem of jury rights is easily avoided. Courts up-
holding summary jurisdiction have held, on the basis of the same consent used to find
jurisdiction, that the counterclaim defendant waived his right to jury pro tanto. See,
e.g., Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 390 (10th Cir. 1955) ; In re Nathan,
98 F. Supp. 686, 692 (S.D. Cal. 1951). This rationale is difficult to accept; for if the
guarantee of jury trial really exists, it is fictional in the extreme to hold that it was
waived when the claimant is not given a reasonable opportunity to claim it. See FED. R. Cim.
P. 38; cf. note 19 supra.
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priate.G7 Either procedure would preserve jury rights without requiring the
trustee to initiate new proceedings in a distant forum.
In conclusion, it appears that the competing interests involved in counter-
claim situations can best be accommodated by permitting the bankruptcy court
to adjudicate permissive counterclaims, with or without the creditor's consent,
unless the creditor demonstrates that such adjudication will prejudice his
rights. It has been suggested that this conclusion might impede swift liquida-
tion of the bankrupt estate by discouraging creditors from filing relatively
small claims when they suspect the trustee may have a more substantial claim
against them.58 Yet, even conceding this possibility, and the fact that creditors
may not easily be shaken from their prejudice against referees, these considera-
tions seem insufficient to justify a failure to implement the congressional policy
of increasing the power and status of the referee sitting as a court of bank-
ruptcy.
56. When the trustee's counterclaim involves matters which are usually subject to
jury trial it is possible to analogize the situation to the assertion of a legal counterclaim
to an equitable suit. In that situation, the counterclaim defendant has a right to jury
trial if it is properly claimed. See United States v. National City Bank, 83 F.2d 236
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 563 (1936); Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893 (4th Cir.
1927); 3 'MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 13.03 (2d ed. 1948). This is true today, under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not so much on an argument that the federal court
lacks equitable jurisdiction of the counterclaim as on the more direct argument that the
counterclaim defendant should have his right to jury trial preserved intact. If this analogy
is extended to bankruptcy, the claimant met with a "legal" counterclaim in the bankruptcy
court will still have his right to jury. Cf. Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92
(1932) ; American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U.S. 360 (1922).
57. Section 19b of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "if a jury is not in attendance
upon the court [defined in § 1(9) to include referees], one may be specially summoned for
the trial or the case may be postponed." This section would seem to authorize the referee
to impanel a jury specially. But see 2 COLLIER 1f 19.04, at 227 n.2. Even if it does, how-
ever, jury trial would seem to require an experienced trial judge as well as a jury.
Transfer to the district court would therefore seem the more appropriate remedy. See
Moore & Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?
57 YALE L.J. 683, 711 (1948). The jury trial question should not be confused with the
venue question, however; if the objection is based on jury rights, the proper district court
would seem to be the court which originally referred the matter to the referee.
58. See Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 285 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1932) ("The risk inci-
dent to a general appearance and consent to adjudication of claims of all kinds might easily
deter where the right to recover is clear") ; Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d
382, 399 (10th Cir. 1955) (dissent).
The extent to which creditors actually would abstain from filing claims is highly
speculative. Under § 57n of the Bankruptcy Act, claims not filed within six months of
the general creditors' meeting cannot, ordinarily, be allowed at all. Thus, unless the
creditor were quite certain that the trustee had and in fact would assert a sizeable
claim against him, and that he would be materially prejudiced by having to litigate the
merits before the referee, the creditor would be taking the risk that his claim against
the bankrupt would never be realized.
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